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Abstract
This paper develops a model which can explain the hump-shaped impulse response
of inﬂation to a monetary shock. A standard New Keynesian (NK) model is augmented
so as to include dynamic externality with sticky wages and variable capital utilization.
In our analysis, we assume purely forward-looking nominal rigidities in nominal prices
and wages ´ a la Calvo (1983). Nevertheless, we can show that inﬂation is hump-shaped
under a reasonable range of parameters. It will be also shown that, in order for inﬂation
to be hump-shaped, sticky wages and variable capital utilization are important as well
as dynamic externalities.
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1 Introduction
Sticky prices are one of the most important elements in the New Keynesian model (NK
model) and the policy analysis based upon it. Under nominal rigidities ´ a la Calvo (1983)
or ´ a la Rotemberg (1982), an expression for inﬂation can be obtained in a very simple
form called the New Keynesian Phillips Curve(NKPC). It has been one of the fundamental
equations for the analysis of the monetary policy as discussed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999).
The NKPC is theoretically appealing because it can be derived from a rational expecta-
tion model with staggered price contracts and gives us intuitive descriptions of the supply
side in the economy. Despite its theoretical appeal, however, the NKPC has been subject to
criticism due to its counterfactual predictions. For example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and
Fuhrer (1997) point out that NKPC predicts the expected change in inﬂation must decrease
when the output gap is positive. Nelson (1998) concluded that standard Calvo (1983) type
staggered price setting cannot generate the hump-shaped impulse response function (IRF
hereafter) that estimated VARs characterize1. Mankiw and Reis (2002) report similar re-
sults: The sticky price model generates implausible responses to monetary policy shocks:
1Delayed responses of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock can be seen from VAR literature. Stock and
Watson (2001) ran simple VAR with inﬂation rate, unemployment rate and FF rate, and concluded the
responses of inﬂation to FF rate shock is delayed. Gali (1992) estimated a structural VAR with long-run
and short-run restrictions. His IRF of inﬂation to M1 shock is hump-shaped and its peak is 8th period after
monetary policy shock.
2The eﬀect of monetary policy on inﬂation is immediate in the sticky price model2.
In general, the literature has considered two ways of extending the NKPC to generate
a hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation to monetary policy shocks. First, the inclusion of lagged
inﬂation in the equation can yield hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
propose relative contract wage setting, which allows inﬂation to be a function of the lagged
inﬂation3. Roberts (1997), Roberts (2001) and Ball (2000) stress the importance of less than
perfectly rational economic agents who expect the future inﬂation by univariate forecasting
with the lagged inﬂation. Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido
(2001) estimated a hybrid NKPC, which assumes that a fraction of the ﬁrms determines its
price according to a backward looking rule of thumb. Woodford (2003, Chap. 3) proposes
an explanation for the hybrid NKPC, using backward looking indexation. However, these
eﬀorts to include the lagged inﬂation are hard to defend and less than convincing, because
they have no clear theory explaining why the economic agents expect the future inﬂation
by a univariate forecasting rule, why there is a fraction of non-rational economic agents and
why the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm follows the backward indexation rule speciﬁed in
Woodford (2003).
Second, serially correlated errors in the NKPC can generate a hump-shaped response
of inﬂation to monetary policy shocks. Rotemberg (1997) ﬁrst proposed this direction. He
introduces an AR(1) error term in the NKPC and shows that the inﬂation is hump-shaped in
the IRF to a cost push shock. Although the introduction of the AR(1) error itself is ad hoc,
2In some exceptional cases, Taylor (1980) type nominal rigidities seem to be able to generate hump-
shaped impulse response. For example, Erceg (1997) uses Taylor type staggered wages and ﬂexible prices to
show that inﬂation can be hump-shaped in response to a monetary shock, although the reason hasn’t been
explored clearly.
3Nelson (1998) reports this Fuhrer and Moore (1995)’s expression for inﬂation is the only model in which
the inﬂation response could be hump-shaped.
3this direction has been extended to recent literature that emphasizes Kalman ﬁltering or
learning. Erceg and Levin (2003) focus on the imperfect information between private sectors
and the central bank. They model serially correlated forecast errors with learning. Although
Erceg and Levin (2003) did not show a hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation, Keen (2003), following
the same idea as Erceg and Levin (2003), showed the inﬂation is hump-shaped in response to
a monetary shock when imperfect information exists between private sectors and the central
bank.
This paper explores another possible explanation for hump-shaped response of inﬂation.
Throughout the paper, I do not take the assumptions - less than perfectly rational agents,
hybrid NKPC, backward indexation, nor even Kalman ﬁltering - discussed above. However,
I do assume a propagation mechanism: Dynamic externality through a production spillover
in which the stock of organizational capital accumulates over time according to the level of
aggregate output. This kind of dynamic externalities plays an important role for generating
a hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation in response to a monetary shock, if they are combined with
staggered wage contracts and variable capital utilization.
In RBC literature, a number of papers have analyzed the eﬀect of organizational capital
as a propagation mechanism. For example, Cooper and Johri (1997) focused on dynamic
complementarities which are external to an individual ﬁrm. Similarly, Cooper and Johri
(2002) and Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002) study the eﬀect of learning-by-doing
as a propagation mechanism in RBC. In their analysis, the learning-by-doing is assumed
to be internal rather than external. However, the dynamics of organizational capital are
extremely similar to our case in that organizational capital (or human capital in their context)
accumulates over time according to the level of production activity. In any case, the role of
4organizational capital is found to be powerful as an endogenous propagation mechanism in
RBC models.
In a NK model, organizational capital may play more important role for inﬂation than
for output, because changes in organizational capital directly aﬀect ﬁrms’ marginal costs
via changes in the productivity. When an expansionary monetary shock occurs and output
increases, organizational capital is accumulated through production activity, leading to high
productivity and low marginal cost. Low marginal cost turns out to be a disincentive to
pricing high in response to an expansionary monetary shock.
I emphasize the combined eﬀect of the dynamic externality with sticky wages and variable
capital utilization: The eﬀect of the organizational capital on inﬂation appears signiﬁcantly
only when dynamic externalities are combined with both sticky wages and variable capital
utilization. I found that, under ﬂexible wages or constant capital utilization, the incentive
to price higher owing to higher factor prices overpowers the disincentive resulting from the
dynamic externality.
This paper contributes by showing that a thoroughgoing NK model can explain the
observed behavior of inﬂation. Necessary ingredients besides sticky prices are dynamic ex-
ternalities, sticky wages, and variable capital utilization. The NK model augmented by these
features can ﬁx the problem of inﬂation persistence unsolved in a standard NK model which
incorporates only sticky prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the speciﬁc model used
in the simulations. The section 3 shows that the IRFs of inﬂation to a money growth shock
is hump-shaped and explains the mechanism underlying that shape. The model therefore
replicates the stylized facts on the estimated IRF qualitatively. Moreover, the model can
5explain the observed IRF of the marginal cost behavior as well. The section 4 discusses
that the hybrid NKPC generates quite questionable prediction, given the estimated IRF of
marginal costs which will be proxied by the unit labor cost, although the hybrid NKPC can
generate the observed hump-shaped behavior of inﬂation. The section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the model economy. We assume monopolistic competition in
both the goods and labor markets as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003). The model consists of a representative goods aggregator, a
representative labor aggregator and a government as well as monopolistic competitive ﬁrms
and monopolistic competitive households. To include sticky prices and wages, we assume
that the nominal price and wage adjustments are possible only at some constant hazard rate.
This Calvo (1983)-style timing of nominal rigidity can reduce the number of state variables
in the model and give us a NKPC for both price and wage inﬂation.
2.1 Firms
Following the literature, we introduce an output aggregator and monopolistic competitive
ﬁrms with constant-returns to scale technology of the Dixit-Stiglitz form. An output aggre-
gator produces a ﬁnal good Yt for household’s consumption and investment in the perfect
competitive market. The ﬁnal good is transformed from a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods,
each of which is produced by monopolistic ﬁrms. Under these assumptions, the demand func-







where Yt(f) denotes a diﬀerentiated good and Pt(f) is its price. Pt is the aggregate price
index. f is the index for intermediate good ﬁrms distributed uniformly on [0,1]. ²p > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated goods.
We assume Calvo type staggered price setting so that each ﬁrm is allowed to change its
price only with a probability. Instead of deriving it, we simply start with the NKPC that
is derived from that assumption. Let ¼t denote the gross inﬂation rate ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 and
ˆ ¼t = log(¼t) ¡ log(¼), where ¼ is the steady state value of the gross rate of inﬂation. Then,
the NKPC is given by
ˆ ¼t = ¯Etˆ ¼t+1 + Ψp ˆ mct; (2)
where Ψp and ¯ are parameters satisfying Ψp > 0 and 0 < ¯ < 1 and ˆ mct is the log-deviation
of marginal cost from the steady state value.
The intermediate good ﬁrm faces perfectly competitive factor markets for the eﬀective
capital input(deﬁned below) ˜ Kt(f) and the labor input Lt(f), which it rents in competitive
factor markets4. For this reason, each intermediate good ﬁrm takes the rental price of
eﬀective capital, Rk
t, and the aggregate wage index, Wt, as given.
Suppose that the production function for ﬁrm f is Cobb-Douglas in eﬀective capital and
4It is not a contradiction to the assumption of monopolistic competitive households in their labor market.
The households sell the labor to the labor aggregator in monopolistic competitive markets, but the labor
aggregator sells its aggregate labor to the intermediate good ﬁrms in a competitive market. For this reason,
we may assume the intermediate goods ﬁrm face a competitive labor market.
7labor:





where ® 2 (0;1) and Xt is external organizational capital. The steady state value of X
is assumed to be one, so that production function converges to constant returns to scale
technology in the long run.
Organizational capital accumulates through production activity. The law of motion of

















where ° 2 (0;1) captures the persistence of the external eﬀect and ´ > 0 captures the eﬀect
of current aggregate output on individual production. Y is the steady state level of aggregate
output. Thus, there is a spillover eﬀect in the production process.
Given the production function and the assumption of perfectly competitive factor mar-
kets, the real marginal cost function mct and the marginal rate of substitution between
inputs from the static cost minimization problem take the form:



















where wt is real wage rate (i.e. wt = Wt=Pt) and rk
t is real rental cost of eﬀective capital (i.e.
rk
t = Rk
t=Pt). Note that the index f is dropped because all intermediate ﬁrms face identical
8factor prices.
2.2 Households
Each household, indexed by h 2 (0;1), is assumed to supply a diﬀerentiated labor service
to ﬁrms. As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume a representative labor
aggregator which buys households’ diﬀerentiated labor supply Lt(h) to produce a single
composite labor service Lt which it sells to intermediate good ﬁrms. It is simply parallel








where ²w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated labor. Wt(h) is the
nominal wage for diﬀerentiated labor.
We set up the household’s maximization problem. We assume the following expected


















where Ct(h) is the consumption and Mt(h) is the end-of-period money holding. We assume
b > 0 which allows habit persistence.
9Next, let us consider the household’s budget constraint. It is given by
Wt(h)Lt(h) + R
k
t ˜ Kt(h) + Γt(h) + Tt(h) (9)
= Pt
"










+ Bt(h) ¡ Rt¡1Bt¡1(h) + Mt(h) ¡ Mt¡1(h):
For the income side, his source of income is labor income Wt(h)Lt(h), returns from eﬀective
capital service Rk
t ˜ Kt(h), the sum of the proﬁts from ﬁrms in the economy Γt(h), and a lump-
sum transfer from the government to the household Tt(h). To analyze the eﬀect of capital
utilization, eﬀective capital is deﬁned as the product of the actual capital stock Kt(h) and
capital utilization Ut(h):
˜ Kt(h) = Ut(h)Kt(h): (10)
The actual capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1(h) = (1 ¡ ±Ut(h)
³)Kt(h) + It(h); (11)
where ³ > 1 and It(h) denotes the investment. In this equation, the depreciation rate is
increasing function in Ut(h). This dependence of the depreciation rate on utilization makes
the optimal utilization rate variable. We assume that capital utilization rate in the steady
state is equal to one. Thus, the law of motion for capital becomes standard only in the
long-run.
For the spending side of the budget constraint, the household purchases the ﬁnal goods
for consumption and investment. In making the investment, the household loses ﬁnal goods








cost is zero when the investment-capital ratio is equal to the steady state value ±.6 Finally,
he spends his income for ﬁnancial assets in the form of the net increase in money (Mt(h) ¡
Mt¡1(h)) and government bonds (Bt ¡ Rt¡1Bt¡1(h)).
We assume that every household faces the same initial conditions and that the contingent
markets are complete. Then, we have the symmetric equilibrium value for control variables
except for Wt(h). These assumptions allow us to drop the household index h for Ct(h), It(h),
Ut(h), Mt(h), Bt(h), and Kt+1(h).
In order to make a decision for these variables, the household maximizes his expected
utility function (8) subject to (9), (10), (11). The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows:
5Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003) uses the adjustment cost of investment rather than the
adjustment cost of capital. In our case, I use much more standard capital adjustment cost, because the
adjustment cost of investment adds a new state variable to the model, and investment exhibits a hump
shape in its IRF. We avoid using investment adjustment cost function because such a new state variable not
only complicates the model, but also makes the eﬀect of the dynamic externality on inﬂation and output
gap less clear.







Kt(h) with the steady state value
of utilization diﬀerent from zero. However, we can normalize the steady state value of the capital utilization
































































where mt ´ Mt=Pt is real money holding at the end of the period t. Qt is Lagrange mul-
tiplier for the capital accumulation equation (11) and ¸t is the marginal utility for current
consumption:
¸t = (Ct ¡ bCt¡1)
¡¾c ¡ ¯bEt(Ct+1 ¡ bCt)
¡¾c: (17)
These ﬁrst order conditions are quite standard. The equation (12) is a standard Euler
equation for consumption. It equates the marginal utility of consumption today with the
discounted marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. The equation (13) is the money
demand function: Real money holding are positively correlated with marginal utility and
negatively correlated with the opportunity cost of holding money. The equation (14) is
the ﬁrst order condition for investment. Under our speciﬁcation of the adjustment cost
of capital, the investment-capital rate is linearly related to the marginal q in terms of the
marginal utility. The equation (15) is the marginal condition for variable capital utilization.
12The marginal beneﬁt of capital utilization is equalized to the marginal cost of it: Marginal
depreciation costs. The equation (16) determines the shadow price of investment. By solving
the equation forward, Qt is expressed as the present discounted value of net marginal beneﬁts
of actual capital stock.
2.2.1 Wage Setting
We go to the wage setting behavior. We assume that the nominal wage contracts are anal-
ogous to the price setting behavior. In each period, the household is allowed to reoptimize
its nominal wages with a probability. As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), Calvo type
staggered wage setting gives us the following wage NKPC to a ﬁrst order approximation:
ˆ ¼
w




¾Lˆ Lt ¡ ˆ ¸t ¡ ˆ wt
i
; Ψw > 0 (18)
where ˆ ¼w
t is the log-deviation of wage inﬂation from the steady state value. That is, ˆ ¼w
t =
log(¼w
t ) ¡ log(¼w), where ¼w
t = Wt=Wt¡1 and ¼w is the gross rate of wage inﬂation in the
steady state. Similarly, ˆ ¸t and ˆ wt are the log-deviation from the steady state of marginal
utility of consumption and real wages, respectively. Finally, Ψw is a parameter. The ﬁrst two
terms inside the bracket are the log-deviation of marginal rate of substitution between labor
supply and consumption from the steady state. Thus, the diﬀerence between the marginal
rate of substitution and the real wage aﬀects the wage inﬂation rate.
132.3 Closing the model
To close the model, we specify the government budget constraint, monetary policy and
market clearing condition. The government budget is balanced every period (i.e. (Mt ¡
Mt¡1)+(Bt¡Rt¡1Bt¡1) = Tt, for all t). Its total lump-sum transfer is set equal to seignorage
revenue.
We specify the monetary policy by the growth rate of money supply. The gross growth
rate of money supply gt ´ Mt=Mt¡1 is given by AR(1) process in logarithm:
log(gt+1) = (1 ¡ ½)log(g) + ½m log(gt) + et+1; et » N(0;¾
2
e); (19)
where 0 < ½m < 1, ¾e > 0 and g is the steady state value of money growth rate.
Market clearing condition is given by



















142.4 Model Solution and Parameters
2.4.1 Model Solution
The log-linearized model is used to analyze the solution to the model. Since some of the
equations such as (2) and (18) are already log-linearized, we take log-linearizations of other
Euler equations and several model identities around the steady state. There are 16 equations
to be log-linearized: (3)-(6), (10)-(17), (19)-(22). Therefore, we obtain 18 log-linearized
equations. On the other hand, we have 18 unknowns. ˆ Yt, ˆ ¼t, ˆ ¼w
t , ˆ rk
t , ˆ Rt, ˆ mct, ˆ Lt, ˆ Ut, ˆ ˜ Kt,
ˆ It, ˆ Qt, ˆ ¸t, ˆ Ct¡1, ˆ Xt¡1, ˆ Kt, ˆ wt¡1, ˆ mt¡1, ˆ gt. The last 6 variables in the list of the variables
are the state variables in the model. That is, lagged consumption, lagged organizational
capital, capital stock, lagged real wages, lagged real balance, and money growth rate are
predetermined or exogenous. Finally, the log-linearized system of equations has a unique
equilibrium at the model parameters calibrated below.
2.4.2 Parameterization
We have parameters to be speciﬁed from outside the model. Since the model is calibrated
at a quarterly frequency, we assume that ¯ = 0:99. The preference parameters in the utility
function follows the literature: ¾C = 1 and ¾L = 2. The habit parameter is set to b = 0:657.
The elasticities of demand functions are ²p = ²w = 11, which implies 10% mark-up in
the long-run. The parameters Ψp and Ψw in two NKPCs are given in a standard way8:
7This calibrated value of habit parameter is the same as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003).
8In the literature of the NK model, for example Gali (2002), Ψp is a function of ¯ and the probability
that ﬁrms can reoptimize their nominal price. Letting 1 ¡ »p be the probability, the parameter Ψp is given
by
(1¡»p)(1¡¯»p)
»p . Ψp = 0:0858 is standard, because »p = 0:75 gives Ψp = 0:0858. Similarly, letting 1¡»w be
the probability that households can change their nominal wage, Ψw is given by
(1¡»p)(1¡¯»p)
»p(1+²w¾L) . The values of
»w = 0:75, ¾L = 2 and ²w = 11 gives Ψw = 0:0037.
15Ψp = 0:0858 and Ψw = 0:0037.
I assume ± = 0:025, which implies 10% depreciation in a year in the steady state. This
parameterization also implies the convex cost structure on variable capital utilization. In
this parameterization of ±, ³ will be found to be 1.4049.
As for the production side, we need to assign calibrated values of Á, °, ´, and ®. I take a
relatively wide range of calibrated values of Á: Á 2 [0;0:4] for simulation10. I take Á = 1=3 as
a baseline and check diﬀerent values of Á in sensitivity analysis. On the other hand, I follow
Cooper and Johri (2002) in calibrating ° and ´, that is, ° = ´ = 0:5. Finally, I assume that
the total cost share of eﬀective capital inputs is 0.36 (i.e. ® = 0:36).
For the adjustment cost of capital, we set Ák = 3:0. In the empirical literature on in-
vestment, the estimates of the adjustment cost parameter diﬀer depending on the estimation
methods. Eberly (1997) estimated that Ák lies between 5.6 and 11.1 using linear q-equations,
while Whited (1992) found that it ranges from 0.54 to 2.05, using Euler equation approach.
9To see this, note that the ﬁrst order condition (16) in the steady state becomes
Q = ¸rk + ¯Q(1 ¡ ±);
where a variable without time subscript is the steady state value. Because Q=¸ = 1 from (14),
1 =
¯
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)
rk:





Thus, given ¯ and ±, the value of ³ has to be determined uniquely. Substituting ¯ = 0:99 and ± = 0:025, ³
turns out to be 1.404. See Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) for the details.
10The calibrated values assigned here are controversial. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1995), Basu (1996), Sbordone (1996) and others argue against external increasing returns to scale proposed
by Caballero and Lyons (1992) and Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons (1994). On the other hand, Harrison
(2003) found externalities in both consumption and investment sector, although she consider static exter-
nalities. Cooper and Johri (1997) and Cooper and Johri (2002) found evidence for the eﬀect of macro-level
organizational capital from the production function estimation.
16Our calibrated value of Ák approximately takes the middle of their estimates: Ák is 3.0.
The monetary policy parameter ½m is assumed to be 0.5, as suggested as Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998). The value of ½ does not aﬀect qualitative results for IRF
analysis. The steady state value of money growth rate is set to 1.005, which implies 2%
money growth rate per year if the economy is in the steady state.
























Table 1: Calibrated Parameters in the model
173 Eﬀects of a Money Growth Rate Shock
3.1 Stylized Facts and Unit Labor Costs
To conﬁrm the stylized facts in the VAR literature, I run a simple VAR similar to Walsh
(2002)’s. He ran a three variable-VAR (output, inﬂation and the money growth rate) to
generate some stylized facts about the IRFs of inﬂation and the output gap. Into this simple
VAR, I add unit labor cost as a proxy for marginal cost, because the behavior of the marginal
cost is critically important in our analysis11.
Fig 1 shows the resulting IRFs to one standard deviation shock to money growth rate12.
The number of lags was selected to be three on the basis of AIC. As shown in Fig. 1, inﬂation
and the output gap have hump-shaped IRFs: The peak for inﬂation occurs at the eighth
quarter while the peak for the output gap occurs at the ﬁfth quarter.
In certain circumstances, unit labor cost proxies well for marginal cost13. The data
therefore suggests that the IRF of marginal cost is reduced for seven quarters after a money
growth rate shock and increased only after eight quarters.
11We could have run a much larger VAR to conﬁrm the stylized facts as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2003) did. However, a VAR with many variables usually has large standard error bands and often
lacks robust IRFs. For our purposes, it will be enough just to conﬁrm the stylized facts about inﬂation and
the output gap and to generate stylized facts about marginal cost.
12I HP ﬁltered the logarithm of real GDP and unit labor cost to get the output gap and the marginal cost
gap. I used log-diﬀerence CPI and M2 to obtain the inﬂation rate and the money growth rate. The order of
the variables in the VAR is output gap, marginal cost gap, the inﬂation rate and the money growth rate.
13In order for this relation to hold, we need to assume Cobb-Douglas technology and free mobility of labor
input.




























































Figure 1: Estimated IRFs of inﬂation, the output gap and unit labor cost in
response to one standard deviation shock in money growth rate shock: The sample
is from 1965:1 to 2002:4. The IRFs are estimated 4 variable VAR with lag 3.
193.2 The Role of Dynamic Externality
Fig 2 and 3 implied by our model show several IRFs for increase of the 1% in money growth
rate in the benchmark case.











































Figure 2: With Dynamic Externality:IRF of inﬂation, output gap and marginal cost in
response to 1% of money growth rate shock
As the ﬁrst two panels of Fig 2 shows, inﬂation and output are hump-shaped. The
response of inﬂation peaks in the 12th period after a monetary shock. This shape is qual-
itatively similar to our IRF shown in Fig 1, although the peak is faster than the model’s
prediction. It is also similar to the IRF with many variables estimated by Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2003) except that our inﬂation response shows a positive response in the
initial period of the expansionary monetary shock. Similarly, the output gap peaks in the

































































































Figure 3: With Dynamic Externality:IRF of other variables of interest in response to
1% of money growth rate shock
214th period after the shock. This is also consistent with our ﬁnding from the VAR analysis
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003)’s VAR. Finally, the marginal cost in the
benchmark case behaves interestingly. The log-deviation of marginal cost jumps up initially
but becomes negative from the second through the 11th period, returning to positive values
only after the 12th period. This behavior of the marginal cost is quite similar to our VAR
in Fig. 1.
The IRF of other variables of interest are shown in Fig. 3. As in standard NK models,
we encounter the lack of a liquidity eﬀect in the ﬁrst panel in Fig. 3. Due to the dynamic
externality, productivity shows strong procyclical response to an expansionary monetary
shock. Obviously, consumption shows hump-shape in its IRF, because we assume habit
formation. Investment jumps up at the ﬁrst period and decays to the steady state level.
To get the intuition behind hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation, consider IRF of marginal cost
ﬁrst. The real marginal cost at each period is decomposed into three eﬀects, as shown in
(5).
1. The eﬀect of the real wage : Marginal cost is higher, the higher the real wage.
2. The eﬀect of the rental cost of eﬀective capital: Marginal cost is higher, the higher the
rental cost of capital.
3. The eﬀect of productivity through the dynamic externality: the higher the externality
Xt, the lower marginal cost.
When the money growth rate increases, increased real balances cause real interest rate to
decrease, which in turn causes marginal utility to decrease from (12)14. To meet decreased
14To see this, we solve the log-linearized equation of (12) forward. Because the marginal utility positively
22marginal utility, the consumption must increase, which in turn raises the demand for goods.
To meet more demand for goods, an individual ﬁrm needs to hire more labor and capital.
Thus, the real wages and rental cost of capital will increase. The increase in factor prices
gives the ﬁrm the incentive to price high. However, in our model, the organizational capital
is accumulated due to the increased consumption and investment. For an individual ﬁrm, the
increase in the organizational capital raises ﬁrm’s productivity, because this eﬀect is external
to the ﬁrm. The higher productivity gives the ﬁrm the incentive to price low. Because the
eﬀects of the productivity and the factor prices are canceling each other, the marginal costs
may increase or decrease, depending on the dynamic structure of these three elements above.
In the simulation, the marginal cost after a monetary shock increases at ﬁrst, then decreases
for several periods and then increase again.
Now, the reason for hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation is straightforward. As a ﬁrst approx-
imation, let ¯ = 1. Then, (2) becomes
Etˆ ¼t+1 ¡ ˆ ¼t = ¡Ψp ˆ mct: (23)
In our simulation shown in Fig. 2, ˆ mct is negative from the second to the eleventh quarter
after a monetary shock. Thus, inﬂation is expected to increase and actually increases rather
than decreasing over time, even though the output gap during these periods is positive.
After 12 quarters, ˆ mct becomes positive until it converges to its steady state level of zero,
implying that inﬂation decreases over time. Inﬂation increases as long as ˆ mct is negative and
decreases as long as ˆ mct is positive. This generates the hump-shaped response of inﬂation.
depends on the sum of short-term real interest rate, the decrease in real interest rate causes the marginal
utility to decrease.
23This relationship between marginal cost and inﬂation is surprisingly consistent with our
impulse response analysis. The marginal cost in Fig 1 takes a negative value from the second
to the seventh period and then becomes positive. On the other hand, the peak of inﬂation
is the eighth quarter in Fig 1. In other words, the estimated IRFs show the same pattern as
the model’s prediction: inﬂation is increasing over time while the marginal cost is negative
and inﬂation is decreasing over time after mc becomes positive!
The hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation can be interpreted as follows. After an unexpected
monetary shock, a ﬁrm observes higher demand for its goods and needs to set the price of
its goods in response to higher demand. When it is possible to reset the price, the ﬁrm
will predict that the marginal cost will be high in the future but will be low for several
periods before it increases. Since inﬂation is determined in purely forward-looking manner,
the ﬁrm will take the low marginal costs in the short-run and the high marginal costs in
the intermediate-run into consideration for the determination of its price. Therefore, the
ﬁrm will hesitate to price high while the marginal cost is low in the short-run. However,
ˆ mc is increasing over time, as the externalities weaken and factor prices increase. When
it is possible to reset the price again, the forward looking ﬁrm no longer has such a low
marginal cost. At this point, the incentive to price low created by externalities has become
small, leading the forward looking ﬁrm to set its price higher. Thus, inﬂation response is
hump-shaped not because ﬁrms are backward-looking, but because they are forward-looking.
In our simulation results, the IRF for the output gap is also hump-shaped. This hump-
shaped response of the output gap largely reﬂects habit formation in consumption. However,
the dynamic externality plays a role of an ampliﬁcation mechanism. We will discuss dynamic
externalities as an ampliﬁcation mechanism in a diﬀerent subsection.
24A natural question is what happens if the extent of externalities is diﬀerent from the
benchmark case. Fig. 4 and 5 are IRF when Á = 0. Inﬂation and output gap are front
loaded as shown in Fig. 4. As in the standard NK model, the log-deviation of the marginal
cost jumps up and then decays to the steady state level. It does not become negative. The
reason that inﬂation doesn’t exhibit a hump shape is simple. Without dynamic externalities,
productivity does not change in response to the increase in the production (the second panel
of Fig. 5). Marginal cost increases because of higher factor prices. Therefore, ˆ mc is uniformly
positive and inﬂation is decreasing over time as (23) suggests.











































Figure 4: No Dynamic Externality:IRF of inﬂation, output gap and the marginal cost in
response to 1% of money growth rate shock
Fig. 6 shows the simulation results when Á = 0:4. In this case, inﬂation starts from a

































































































Figure 5: No Dynamic Externality:IRF of other variables of interest in response to 1%
of money growth rate shock
26negative value, implying a decrease in the price level in response to a monetary shock. In
other words, the price puzzle that is apparently found in data results when there are large
externalities. The reason for the price puzzle is also straightforward: The productivity eﬀect
in the short-run is so great that it is optimal for ﬁrms to price low in the short-run.



































Figure 6: Large Dynamic Externality:IRF of inﬂation and output gap in response to 1%
of money growth rate shock
3.3 The Role of Sticky Wages and Variable Capital Utilization
In this subsection, we discuss the role of sticky wages and variable capital utilization. In
the analysis in the previous subsection, we found that the behavior of marginal cost is
important: When the log-deviation of the marginal cost takes negative values in the short-
27run and positive values in the intermediate-run, the inﬂation can be hump-shaped. It will
be shown that sticky wages and variable capital utilization are important for generating
such a behavior of the marginal cost and that dynamic externalities alone cannot generate a
hump shape in inﬂation. That is, the hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation is obtained only when
dynamic externalities are combined with sticky wages and variable capital utilization.
To analyze the eﬀect of sticky wages and variable capital utilization, we use (5) to take
the log-linearization of the marginal cost around the steady state:
ˆ mct = ˆ P
f
t ¡ Á ˆ Xt;
where ˆ P
f
t ´ (1 ¡ ®) ˆ wt + ®ˆ rk
t . In other words, ˆ P
f
t is the weighted average of real wages and
rental cost of eﬀective capital. The second term in the equation Á ˆ Xt shows the log-deviation
of the productivity through dynamic externality.
Fig. 7 makes the eﬀect of sticky wages and capital utilization clearer. At each panel
of the ﬁgure, the IRFs of factor prices ˆ P
f
t and productivity Á ˆ Xt to a monetary shock are
shown. The upper left panel of the ﬁgure is the benchmark case while the lower right panel
of the ﬁgure is the case of ﬂexible wages and constant capital utilization. In the oﬀ-diagonal
panels of the ﬁgure are the case in which either of sticky wages or variable capital utilization
is missing in the simulation.
Note that only in the upper left panel does the productivity exceed the factor prices
in the response for several periods and then reverse after those periods. Thus, ˆ mc is ﬁrst
negative and then positive. As shown in the previous subsection, inﬂation is hump-shaped
due to this negative response of ˆ mc. On the other hand, the factor prices in the other panels















































periods/ With Sticky Wage and Variable Capital Utilization


















































periods/ With Flexible Wage and Variable Capital Utilization
















































periods/ With Sticky Wage and Constant Capital Utilization














































periods/ With Flexible Wage and Constant Capital Utilization
Figure 7: Factor Prices and Productivity:The line with (+) is the log-deviation of factor
prices from the steady state value ˆ P
f
t and the line with (-) is productivity. The factor price
minus productivity is the log-deviation of the marginal cost.
29of the ﬁgure are always larger than productivity in the log-deviation response, which implies
that ˆ mc always takes positive values in response to a monetary shock. Therefore, inﬂation
is never hump-shaped.
We can see that both sticky wages and variable capital utilization are important. In the
upper right panel of the ﬁgure, capital utilization is variable but real wages are ﬂexible. In
this case, the factor price eﬀect overwhelms the productivity eﬀect in its magnitude, because
real wages is adjusted upward quickly. In the lower left panel, real wages are sticky but
capital utilization is constant. As a result, the rental cost of eﬀective capital is adjusted
upward so much that factor prices exceed productivity, although the magnitude of factor
prices shifts down closer to that of productivity15. Finally, under ﬂexible wages and constant
capital utilization, the eﬀect of factor prices is so strong that the productivity eﬀect is almost
negligible.
3.4 Dynamic Externality as an Ampliﬁcation Mechanism
As pointed out, the hump-shaped dynamics of output gap largely rely on the assumption of
habit formation in consumption. Nevertheless, when Á = 0, the output gap was front loaded
as shown in the second panel of Fig 416.
The intuition for hump-shaped output under Á = 1=3 is straightforward. The increased
15Although real wages ˆ w show a hump shape in its response, ˆ Pf does not. This is because ˆ Pf is the
weighted average of real wages and rental cost of capital and the response of ˆ rk is much larger in its
magnitude than in the case of variable capital utilization. While real wages are hump-shaped, the rental
cost of capital is not only front loaded but also jumps up to a large extent. Because of the large front loaded
rental cost, ˆ Pf as the weighted average doesn’t exhibit hump-shaped behavior in its IRF.
16It is easily shown that output can be hump-shaped even without dynamic externality, when we assume
the investment adjustment cost rather than capital adjustment cost. However, the point here is to stress
the importance of dynamic externality as an ampliﬁcation mechanism. For expositional purpose, it will be
easier to understand the ampliﬁcation mechanism if it is shown that the output gap is front loaded under
Á = 0 but the output gap becomes hump-shaped under the degree of externality diﬀerent from zero.
30demand for goods raises productivity. The price for goods is lower when there are exter-
nalities than otherwise due to increased productivity. Because of the lower price of goods,
the increase in the demand for goods is larger. Thus, externalities amplify the eﬀect of
habit persistence. In fact, the response of the consumption in the third panel of Fig. 3 are
larger than that in Fig. 5. As a result, the output response becomes more similar to the
consumption response17.
Another natural question we may ask is whether habit formation is important for inﬂa-
tion and output dynamics. Fuhrer (2000) included habit formation in his general equilibrium
model and concluded inﬂation with habit formation in consumption is more persistent than
otherwise18. On the other hand, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003) which uses
NKPC with backward looking indexation concluded that sticky wages and variable capi-
tal utilization are important for generating inﬂation inertia, but habit formation is not so
important for inﬂation inertia and output behavior.
From perspective of IRF, we can show that the role of habit formation is consistent
with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003). Fig 8 shows IRFs of inﬂation, and output
gap with b = 0, holding other parameters at the benchmark values. Inﬂation still exhibits
a pronounced hump shape, even without habit formation in consumption. This result is
consistent with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003)’s conclusion19: Habit formation
17This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the response of the output gap in Fig. 6 exhibits
a more pronounced hump shape than in Fig. 3. When there are larger externalities, the response of the
consumption are more ampliﬁed. As a result, the output gap is more hump-shaped.
18Strictly speaking, he uses the relative contracting model for inﬂation instead of NKPC. Because his
inﬂation equation has lagged inﬂation, we may expect a diﬀerent behavior of inﬂation.
19In Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2003), a policy shock generates a larger initial response in
both output and inﬂation without habit formation in consumption. However, in our case, it generates a
smaller initial response in inﬂation and a larger initial response in output. This is because an initially larger
response in output makes an initial larger response in productivity. Indeed, current productivity depends
on the current output gap through (4). The more the current output, the higher the productivity, implying
31is not so important for inﬂation inertia.




































Figure 8: No Habit Formation in Consumption:IRF of inﬂation, and output gap in
response to 1% of money growth rate Shock
As for the output gap, we obtained a bit diﬀerent conclusion from Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2003). The output gap is only weakly hump-shaped. Because consump-
tion without habit formation is front loaded, the ampliﬁcation mechanism of the dynamic
externality is too weak to get qualitatively plausible output behavior20.
ﬁrm’s stronger incentive to price low.
20When dynamic externality is large enough such as Á = 0:4, we found that output, consumption, and
investment are all hump-shaped. Therefore, dynamic externality itself can generate hump-shaped dynamics
of real variables. In this sense, Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002)’s conjecture that learning by doing may
work in a NK model as a propagation mechanism seems to be correct. However, I employ external propagation
mechanism rather than internal, and the calibration value of Á = 0:4 may be too strong empirically. Thus,
it is better to say that the validity of their conjecture is still an open question.
324 Can the Hybrid NKPC be Consistent with Marginal
Cost Behavior?
In the preceeding section, I showed that a dynamic externality can generate a hump-shaped
IRF for inﬂation without backward-looking rule-of-thumb ﬁrms. However, it is a conventional
wisdom that the hybrid NKPC improves the empirical ﬁt of models and that it can generate
a hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation. Therefore, the hybrid NKPC has been used even though
it doesn’t have a clear microfoundation. In this section, however, I will show that the hybrid
NKPC is not consistent with the observed marginal cost behavior.
Suppose that a researcher wants to use the hybrid NKPC. For example, Christiano,











Multiplying both sides by 1 + ¯, rearranging and assuming ¯ ' 1, we get
Et(ˆ ¼t+1 ¡ ˆ ¼t) ¡ (ˆ ¼t ¡ ˆ ¼t¡1) = ¡Ψp ˆ mct:
Thus, the change of inﬂation must be increasing while ˆ mc is negative, implying that IRF
must be a convex function in time over which mc takes a negative value. Intuitively, the
hybrid NKPC predicts that inﬂation accelerates while mc is negative. Even when mc becomes
positive after several periods, the inﬂation is still increasing. Finally, when mc converges
to zero, inﬂation stops increasing. Inﬂation never returns to the level before the shock of
33money growth rate.
In order for the hybrid NKPC to be compatible with the observed behavior of inﬂation,
the log-deviation of the marginal cost must be positive from the period of a money growth
rate shock. However, we don’t observe this kind of behavior of marginal costs from the data.
This inconsistency of the hybrid NKPC with marginal cost can be also conﬁrmed from
simple regressions. From (2), the empirical version of purely forward-looking NKPC is
¯¼t+1 ¡ ¼t = ¡Ψp ˆ mct + errort (25)
The empirical version of hybrid NKPC (24) is
¯∆¼t+1 ¡ ∆¼t = ¡Ψp ˆ mct + errort (26)
where Ψp is expected to be positive.
Table 2 reports GMM estimates of the purely forward-looking NKPC and the hybrid
NKPC (¯ is set to 0.99.). The Panel A of Table 2 shows that the estimate of Ψp is positive
and signiﬁcant under the purely forward-looking NKPC. On the other hand, the estimate
of Ψp in the hybrid NKPC is negatively related with marginal costs and the coeﬃcient is
insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding seems to be inconsistent with the theory of backward-looking rule
of thumb behavior.
From these points of view, I conclude that hybrid NKPC’s performance is quite question-
able, given the marginal cost behavior proxied by unit labor cost. Moreover, this conclusion
strengthens our conclusion in the simulations. Inﬂation is hump-shaped not because ﬁrms
34Panel A (Purely forward-looking NKPC)
Dependent Var: ¯¼t+1 ¡ ¼t
Estimates of Ψp Overidentiﬁcation Restriction (Â2(7))
0.059 5.366
(0.026) 0.615 (p-value)
Panel B (Hybrid NKPC)
Dependent Var: ¯∆¼t+1 ¡ ∆¼t
Estimates of Ψp Overidentiﬁcation Restriction (Â2(7))
-0.005 9.260
(0.038) 0.235 (p-value)
Table 2: Regressions on Purely Forward-looking NKPC and Hybrid NKPC: The
number in parenthesizes in the ﬁrst column is a standard error of a coeﬃcient. The constant
term is suppressed. the log-diﬀerenced CPI is used for inﬂation rate ¼t. The log-deviation
of the marginal cost is calculated by HP-detrended series of unit labor cost. The sample
period is from 1965:1 to 2002:4. Instruments includes the four lags of marginal costs and
money growth rate.
are backward-looking but because ﬁrms are forward-looking in their price setting.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a dynamic general equilibrium model which includes no irrational eco-
nomic agents and symmetric information between private agents and a central bank, but
can explain the hump-shaped response for inﬂation to money growth shocks. The key as-
sumptions for the hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation are a dynamic externality, sticky wages,
and variable capital utilization. Dynamic externalities give ﬁrms an incentive to price low
because productivity is high in the short-run. However, because real wage increases slowly,
it gives ﬁrms the incentive to price high in the intermediate-run. Variable capital utilization
helps marginal cost to be damped in its magnitude. By combining these three elements,
marginal cost can decrease for several periods but increase in the end. Given this dynamic
35behavior of marginal cost, forward-looking ﬁrms raise their prices only moderately for sev-
eral periods and the response of inﬂation to a monetary shock can be hump-shaped for a
reasonable range of parameters.
When the dynamic externality is large enough, even a price puzzle can emerge. In this
case, the degree of externalities is perhaps too great empirically. But, it could be a possible
explanation for the price puzzle, if the degree of externalities can be reduced by adding other
elements to our model.
The dynamic externality also serves as an ampliﬁcation mechanism for output. In our
simulation, the output gap under dynamic externalities is hump-shaped, while the output
gap without externalities is not. Dynamic externalities amplify the consumption IRF char-
acterized by habit formation in consumption. As a result, IRF of the output gap becomes
more similar to consumption IRF.
Given the observed dynamics of marginal cost, the hybrid NKPC generates a quite ques-
tionable prediction. Rather, the purely forward-looking NKPC seems to be more consistent
with the data than the hybrid one, unlike a conventional wisdom.
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